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Murphy: Cash Tender Offers: A Proposed Definition
CASH TENDER OFFERS: A PROPOSED DEFINITION*
INTRODUCION

In 1968 Congress undertook the regulation of "tender offers" by enacting
the Williams Act, which added sections 14(d) and 14(e) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 However, nowhere in the Act is the term "tender offer"
defined. As a result the Securities Exchange Commission, the courts, and commentators 2 have developed general theories of congressional purpose and intent,
according to which specific transactions are designated as subject to the extensive requirements of the Act. The problems resulting from this definitional
uncertainty have been exacerbated by recent developments in the business
tactics of outsiders seeking acquisition of corporate control through ostensively
private negotiated transactions.3
The most recent transaction to set this definitional problem in bold relief
was Sun Company's acquisition of "negative control" of Becton, Dickinson &
Co.4 Without notice to management or stockholders, or compliance with section
14(d) of the Williams Act,5 Sun Company acquired 35 percent of the voting
stock of Becton, Dickinson, 6 sufficient to prevent the consummation of any
*EDrrOR's NOTE: This note was awarded the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
as the outstanding note submitted by a Senior Candidate in the Spring 1978 Quarter.
I. Originally enacted as the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §3, 82 STAT. 455 (1968),
sections 14(d) and 14(e) are currently codified as 15 U.S.C. §78n(d), (e) (1976). "It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or
otherwise, to make a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of
any equity security . . . if, after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class, unless at the time
copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security
holders such person has filed with the Commission a statement containing such of the inAll requests or invitations for tenders or advertiseformation specified in section [13(d)] ....
ments making a tender offer or requesting or inviting tenders of such a security shall be
filed as a part of such statement and shall contain such of the information contained in such
statement as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe .... Copies of all statements, in the form in which such material is furnished to security holders and the Commission,
shall be sent to the issuer not later than the date such material is first published or sent or
given to any security holders." 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(l) (1976).
2. A number of commentators have pointed to this problem. See, e.g., Appleton, The
Proposed SEC Tender Offer Rules, 32 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1381 (1977); Hazen, Transfers of
Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders- Common Law, Tender Offers,
Investment Companies-anda Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 1049 (1977);
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
86 HARV. L. Rav. 1250, 1250 (1973).
3. Block & Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 133, 13637 (1978).
4. Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Block & Schwarzfeld,
supra note 3, at 136.
5. See note 1 supra.
6. 475 F. Supp. at 790. See also Pretrial Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission at 3,
Id.; Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1 at 1, Id.
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major corporate action without Sun's consent.7 Aquisition was accomplished in
a series of almost simultaneous "privately negotiated" transactions with 38
individual shareholders and institutional investors8 during a two and a half
day time period.9 The purchasing program was challenged in court as a "tender
offer" within the provisions of the Williams Act. The court's recent determination that such simultaneous "private" transactions are subject to the Act's
10
regulations will have far reaching effects in the market for corporate control.
This note will first consider the conventional tender offer and the purpose
of the Williams Act, as revealed by its legislative history and construed
by courts and commentators. Secondly, characteristics of a tender offer developed or inferable from SEC actions, case decisions, and scholarly comment
will be analyzed in order to distill a working definition of the term which will
comport with the congressional purpose of the Act as well as the economic
realities of the market for corporate control. Finally, the proposed definition
will be examined in the context of the litigation between Sun Co. and Becton,
Dickinson as a means of gauging its utility.
THE CONVENTIONAL TENDER OFFER AND THE WLLIAMS

ACr

HistoricalBackground
1
A conventional cash tender offer has generally been conceived as a public
12
bid by an individual, group, or corporation other than the issuer to purchase
3
all or part of the equity or voting stock of a publicly held corporation.

7. 475 F. Supp. at 805. See also Pretrial Brief of Plaintiff, Becton, Dickinson & Co., at 18,
Id.

8. Pretrial Brief of Plaintiff, Becton, Dickinson & Co., at 18, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475
F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 2, 168-70, Id. The
defendant answered that only 33 offerees had sold and denounced the plaintiff's varying attempts to increase that number as a "game" and a "red herring." Id. The trial court had
evidential difficulties with these various submissions and finally concluded that 33 entities or
individuals sold while five institutional investors contacted did not. 475 F. Supp. at 797-98
n.15, 809-10.
9. 475 F. Supp. at 808-10. See also Pretrial Brief of Plaintiffs, Becton, Dickinson & Co. at
2, Id. Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 5, Id.
10. See 475 F. Supp. at 826; Pretrial Brief of Plaintiff, Becton, Dickinson & Co., at 1-2, Id.
See also Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 133-36; The National Law Journal, Feb. 19,
1979 at 1, col. 1.
11. Publicity usually takes the form of an ad placed by the offeror in the Wall Street
Journal, New York Times and one or more newspapers in the target companies' principal
areas of major stockholdings, setting forth the terms of the offer as well as the details of
tendering and acceptance. Alternatively general mailings are made. See, e.g., R. JENNiNG &
H. MAusH, JR., SEcuRmS REGULATION 741 (4th Ed. 1977); Moylan, Exploring the Tender
Offer Provisionsof the FederalSecurities Laws, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 551, 553 (1975), (quoting Senator Williams' remarks in introducing S. 510, the Williams Act, 113 CONG. REc. 854-55
(1967)); Note, supra note 2, at 1251 n.6.
12. The Act specifically excludes from operation of the statute offers by the issuer for its
own securities. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(8)(A) (1976).
13. Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21 CAsE
WsT. REs. L. REv. 613, 613 (1970); Note, The Scope of Section 14(d): What is a Tender Offer?
34 Omo ST. L.J. 375, 375 (1973). The scenario is that of an outsider seeking to gain substantial
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Shareholders are invited to tender their shares for sale at a premium above
market price. 14 The offer is typically conditioned upon a minimum number of
shares being tendered by shareholders and deposited with an identified holder, 15
prior to which the offeror incurs no obligation to purchase any shares. 6 The
offeror's conditional obligation to purchase remains in effect for a limited7
period, during which the offeree usually may not withdraw tendered shares.'
Prior to the Williams Act the offeror's deposit requirements completely deprived the offeree of control over its stock until the sale was consummated or
the offeror terminated the offer.' s Moreover, the possibility of being excluded
from the sale pressured offerees to tender quickly because the offeror was not
required to purchase shares tendered in excess of the specified minimum. 9
The unregulated tender offer is quite different in form and intent from the
classic privately negotiated transaction in which two parties negotiate the price,
timing and terms of a purchase on fairly equal footing in a not unduly
pressured atmosphere. 20 Due to the unequal bargaining power of the offeror
holdings or control of a target company in one swift transaction. Usually, given the size of
the cash outlay required, it is another corporation rather than a single individual who makes
the offer. Also as a practical matter, the tender offer technique would be ineffective with a
closely held corporation where the shareholders are few and holdings of the target stock
proportionally large.
14. The percentage above market price varies according to the offeror's estimates of his
potential return on the investment and the figure most likely to induce the target shareholder
to tender. See Greenhill, Structuring an Offer, 32 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1307 (1977) (discusses various considerations in ascertaining the offer price); Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5 HARV. J. LaIs. 481, 435 n.13
(1968) (stating a rule of thumb of 20% above market price); Note, supra note 2, at 1251 n.9
(indicating that according to a survey conducted in 1967, at the time Congress first considered
the problem, the median price offered was 16% over the market price).
15. Usually the depository of a tender offer is a bank identified in the ad or letter announcing the offer. Often the depository also requires the offeror to deposit in advance the
funds necessary to acquire the minimum number of shares specified in the bid. For a useful
synopsis of the mechanics of a typical tender offer, see Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate
Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. Rzv. 317, 336-37 (1967); Note, supra note 2, at
1252 n.13. In some cases the offeror merely designates a forwarding agent, rather than a bank
depository, to handle the transaction. See E. ARANOW & H. ETNHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 50 (1973).
16. If the response to the bid does not meet the offeror's expectations, this provision
allows him to back out of a losing proposition having only incurred the cost of making the
offer. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 47-48; Fleischer & Mundheim, supra
note 15, at 336.
17. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15 at 51 n.11; Note, supranote 2, at 1252.
18. Moylan, supra note 11, at 555-56; Note, supra note 2, at 1252.
19. However, the offeror typically reserved the right to purchase any portion of the excess
tendered shares on a first-come first-serve basis. Thus, traditionally, offerees who tendered
were locked in without a parity of commitment on the offeror's part. This is in sharp contrast to most market purchases where sellers retain control of their stock until after the
transaction is complete. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 50-51; Moylan, supra
note 11, at 555; Note, supra note 2, at 1252.
20. See Statement of Hon. Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, Hearings Before the Sub
Comm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-14 (July 1, 1968). The problem of what denotes the line between a
privately negotiated transaction and a tender offer was a threshold issue for the court in
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and offerees in an unregulated tender offer and nondisclosure of the offeror's
intentions regarding the target corporation, it was improbable that an informed, rational investment decision could be made by the offerees. 21 Therefore, potential for transactional overreaching existed.2 2 Congress' problem in
tender offer legislation was to regulate the technique without destroying the
private transaction as the core market mechanism for acquisition of corporate
control.23

Until the early 1960's, tender offers were utilized primarily as a device for
the issuer to repurchase its own securities. 24 As such it was a largely unregulated
securities activity, subject only to the general limitation that the solicitations
could not be materially misleading.2 5 During what has been called the "conglomerate merger mania of the early and mid-1960's," 2 6 however, the tender
offer was increasingly used to acquire corporate control. 2 7 Tender offers were
found to be an attractive alternative to the heavily regulated processes of
statutory merger and proxy contests or to expensive purchases of assets.28
Wellman v. Dickinson. In its analysis, the court relied upon the logic and reasoning of
S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 846 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) and subsequent case developments
regarding the proper method of interpretation of the private offering exemption under §4(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933, to distinquish a privately negotiated transaction outside the
scope of the Williams Act and a public transaction within it. 475 F. Supp. at 818-21.
21. Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw.
149, 150 (1966).
22. Investors cannot know if the price is fair by just the existence of a premium. Whether
the value of their share would be more than that offered depends on the offeror's intentions.
The offeror could liquidate the target, or sell its assets off or simply manage it better. Any of
these activities could result in greater profits to shareholders than the premium offered. Conversely, the acquiror's intentions could merely result in maintaining the status quo or
actually reduce the value of each share through poor management. Without some information as to the offeror's intentions it is impossible for an investor to evaluate and decide. See
generally Swanson, supra note 14.
23. See Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares -A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE
L.J. 231, 236-38; Note, supra note 13, at 376-77.
24. Such activity was generally non-control oriented and was utilized mainly during reorganization or management adjustments to the debt/equity ratio of the corporation. See Note,
supra note 2, at 1253.
25. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1972), allows a private action for misrepresentation and fraud in a securities transaction, but the restrictive interpretation of standing to
bring an action under Rule lOb-5 announced in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), operated to limit resort to this action to only
tendering sellers. The Birnbaum rule was reaffirmed in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 43 n.31 (1977). Rule lOb-5, thus, does not provide a remedy for non-tendering
shareholders or the target company management. See Note, supra note 13, at 376 n.6. For an
in-depth discussion of Rule lob-5 application, see Swanson, supra note 14, at 457-66.
26. E. ARANow 9- H. EiNHoRN, supra note 15, at 64.
27. In 1960 there were only 8 tender offers involving companies listed on both the American and New York Stock Exchanges, as compared to 107 in 1966. Further, as the use of tender
offers increased, proxy contests decreased. From 1959 to 1962 outsiders engaged in 23 cash
tender offers and 41 proxy contests in attempting takeovers of corporations with securities
listed on the national exchanges. In the next four years 90 cash tender offers and 63 proxy
contests were utilized. E. ARANow & H. EINHoaN, supra note 15, at 65 n.3; Fleischer &
Mundheim, supra note 15, at 317.
28. Federal securities regulations require extensive advance notice and disclosure of
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Basically, the cash tender offer was cheaper, 29 simpler,3° faster, 31 and had the
advantage of surprise for the outsider seeking control. 32 Viewed tactically, the
tender offer's greatest advantage to the acquisition-minded entity33 was the
offeror's ability to bypass strong and presumably hostile incumbent management by going directly to the shareholders.3 4
proxy contestants and those seeking affirmation of a merger agreement. See, e.g., SEcuxrrrEs
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §14(a), 15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1976); SEC Reg. 14a, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-I to
14a-103 (1972). The purchase of the entire assets of a public corporation can be an enormously
more expensive means of acquiring control than the acquisition of working control through
ownership of a large block of the corporation's equity securities. In addition, shareholder
approval of a sale of assets is required, resulting in consumption of time and resources. See
Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 15, at 318-19.
Further, under the banner of protecting corporate policy, an incumbent management can
use corporate funds to finance their half of a proxy contest. Even in the unlikely event that
they are unsuccessful, this acts to reduce the company's attractiveness because of the depletion
of its coffers. Management may also take a number of defensive actions to gain the stockholders
support as well as withhold stockholder lists from the insurgents. These tactics, plus the
general inertia of public stockholders, give a distinct advantage to the management group. A
classic litigation in this area is the series of cases involving the proxy contest over Loew's,
Inc.: Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 565 (Del. Ch. 1957), 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957),
136 A.2d 191 (Del. Ch. 1957); Tomlinson v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 518 (Del. Ch. 1957); Starr
v. Tomlinson, 166 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 15,
at 318-31; Swanson, supra note 14, at 436-39.
29. At the very worst the outsider retains the shares purchased which, if he is correct in
his assessment of the value of the target corporation, will eventually yield a gain. At best,
control is gained with a minimum of capital investment and without the extensive legal
documentation of the common proxy contest. See Swanson, supra note 14, at 436; Note, Cash
Tender Offers: Judicial Interpretationof Section 14(e), 23 CLEv. STATE L. REv. 262, 263 (1974);
Note, supra note 2, at 1253.
30. See, e.g., Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 15, at 320-21, Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate
Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 499, 501 (1967).

31.

E.

ARANO'W

& H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 65.

32. Note, supra note 2, at 1253 n.19. However, the tender offer has several shortcomings.
First, the very secrecy which gives the offeror the advantage of surprise also impedes initial
investigation of a potential target and determination of the proper moment to offer. This
information must be ascertained without alerting management to the impending offer and
thus triggering defensive maneuvers. Second, upon announcement of the tender offer the
market price generally rises to the level of the offer itself, jeopardizing the success of the offer
by reducing the amount of premium to the shareholder. Third, there are various holdout and
tendering strategies that sophisticated shareholders can pursue which would tend to pressure
the offeror into increasing the bid price, consequently reducing the value of the expected
return. There are tax consequences to the offerees that also militate against tendering, and of
course antitrust regulations may be triggered in some instances. See Swanson, supra note 14,
at 439-42.
33. Such a company, in the vernacular, is known as a "Raider." This appellation is
mainly used pejoratively by participating adversaries or by non-participants adverse to the
entire tender offer process. See, e.g., Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23
N.Y. LAW SCH. L. REv. 687, 688 (1978).
34. See Note, supra note 2, at 1253. But see Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 15, at
321-23. Experience with tender offers led to the development of a number of defensive management tactics such as exerting pressure on the offeror's financial backers, making changes in
the corporate structure, arranging a friendly "counter tender offer" or merger with a "White
Knight," or, direct communication with shareholders urging them not to tender. Whether or
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The economic conditions prevalent in the mid-1960's strategically favored
conglomeration. Therefore, it became "cheaper to buy than to make." 35
Vociferous 6 battles for control, between management and offeror, generated a
great deal of concern among corporate executives, counsel, academicians, and
staff members of the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange.37 The wisdom of
unregulated transfers of corporate control became questioned and this perception of a gap 38 in federal securities regulation was a major impetus for
passage of the Williams Act in 1968.39
Tender Offer Regulation: The Williams Act
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey initially reacted to the tender
offer problem by introducing Senate Bill 2731, which has been appropriately
characterized as the "incumbent management protection act."4 0 The stated
intention of the bill was to "protect proud old companies" from the "piracy"
and "industrial sabotage" of corporate raiders.41 Its most pro-management provision would have required an offeror to provide the issuer of the target shares
with notice 20 days prior to making a cash tender offer.42 However, neither
Senator Williams' bill nor its House counterpart 43 reached the floor of the 89th
Congress. 44
By the time the bill was reintroduced to the 90th Congress as Senate Bill
510, academic and practitioner opinion had coalesced into three competing
philosophies of what constituted fair tender offer regulation. 45 Some opposed
regulation, fearing that the inevitable effect would be over-regulation and
not such activity was successful, the target management usually made the acquisition much
more costly while tainting it with an air of disrespectibility. Id.
35. Quoted in Liman, supra note 30, at 688. General economic factors cited as underlying
reasons for the rapid growth of tender offers were increased corporate liquidity, readily
available credit, greater knowledge and sophistication of tender techniques, and the psychological appeal of straight dollars-and-cents language to normally apathetic shareholders. See
E. ARANOW & H. E1NHORN, supranote 15, at 65-66.
36. Hazen, supranote 2, at 1047.
37. For a detailed recitation of one such contest see Swanson, supra note 14, at 449-55.
See generally Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAw. 611 (1968): Manne, Cash
Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE L.J. 231; Sowards &
Mofsky, supra note 30.
38. The "gap" was characterized, on one hand, as a serious hole in investor protection.
See Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 30, at 500; Note, Cash Tender Offers, 50 INDiANA LJ. 114,
119 (1974). On the other hand, it was seen as a mere technical gap in already excessive securities regulation, to be dosed without destroying the technique. See, e.g., Moylan, supra note
11, at 556; Note, supra note 2, at 1254.
39. Note, supra note 2, at 1254.
40. Moylan, supra note 11, at 553.
41. 111 CoNG. REc. 28256, 28257-60 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams). Although
Senator Williams subsequently modified his viewpoint, the remarks two years later of the
co-sponsor of S. 510, Senator Kuchel, reflect retention of this protectionist attitude. 113 CONG.
REc. 854-55, 857-58, 24662-66 (1967).
42. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
43. H.R. 14417, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
44. Soward &Mofsky, supra note 30, at 508 n.27.
45. See Note, supra note 13, at 376-77.
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destruction of the technique as a practical business alternative to the proxy
contest. 46 The major proponent of this viewpoint, Professor Manne, argued
that the technique provided positive advantages to the target shareholders and
to the free market system by providing public investors with an opportunity
for a premium gain and assuring competitive efficiency among corporate managers.4 7 On the other hand, tender offer critics generally fell into two camps:
those who attacked the acquisition technique48 and those who criticized specific
49
aspects, but commended its utility if properly regulated.
Congress passed S-510, known as the Williams Act, apparently adopting the
latter viewpoint that the tender offer was a desirable market technique which
however, required regulation. 50 The two primary objectives of Congress, as
stated in the Act's legislative history, appear to be (1) investor protection by
relevant disclosure and (2) interest balancing between the target managment
and the offeror in order to preserve the viability of the tender offer teclmique5'
while allowing each an equal opportunity to fairly present its case. 52 Recognizing the second objective's importance, the drafting committees took "extreme
care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management
or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."' 3 However, the Congressional reports indicate that if these two purposes are placed at odds, the interest of the investing public in full and relevant disclosure should predomi54

nate.

46. Id. See also E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 66; Fleischer & Mundheim,
supra note 15, at 348-49.
47. Manne, supra note 37, at 241-43. See also Brudney, A Note On Chilling Tender
Solicitations,21 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 616-18 (1967); Note, supra note 13, at 377.
48. Note, supra note 13, at 376. See also 113 CONG. REc. 857-58 (1967) (remarks of Senator
Kuchel).
49. Cohen, supra note 37, at 619; Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 30, at 523; Swanson, supra
note 14, at 455-56.
50. Then SEC Chairman, Cohen was a proponent of this viewpoint. See Senate Hearings
on S.510 before the SubComm. on Securities of Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 175, 244 (1967); Hearing on H.R. 14475 before SubComm. on Commerce
and Finance of House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. at
10-17 (1968) (statement of SEC Chairman Cohen).
51. S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 4-5 (1968).
52. 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams). The Senator's attitude
was adopted by the reports of the Senate and House Committees which considered the
matter. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 4 (1968).
53. S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 4 (1968).
54. The purpose sections of both the House and Senate reports state: "While the bill may
discourage tender offers or other attempts to acquire control by some who are unwilling to
expose themselves to the light of disclosure, the committee believes this is a small price to pay
for adequate protection. In fact experience ... has amply demonstrated that the disclosure
requirements of the Federal securities acts are an aid to legitimate business transactions, not
a hindrance." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 4-5 (1968). The number of commentators reaching the same conclusion is legion. See,
e.g., Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y. LAW F. 459, 465-69 (1969); Note,
Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers - A Few PracticalRecommendations, 50 INDANA L.J.
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In brief, the enacted legislation contains in subsection provisions requiriing
55
proxy-type disclosure concurrent with the tender offer announcement. This
subsection ostensively attempts to protect all three principle parties of a
56
tender offer, the offerees, the target issuer, and to some degree, the offeror. The
other substantive provisions of the Act, subsections 14(d)5-8, are designed to
protect those investors who have committed themselves by tendering their
shares. These provisions create withdrawal rights in offerees who deposit their
securities pursuant to a tender offer.57 Pro-rata provisions also apply in the
8
instance of share tendering in excess of the offeror's requirements. Under
these provisions any increase in tender prices is given to all stock deposited
114, 115-16, 122 (1974); Note, Tender Offer Regulation -Injunction Standards under the
Williams Act, 45 FoanslAm L. REv. 51, 54-55 (1976).

55. See note 1, supra. The Williams Act also made three other changes to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The first of these, Section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. §78m(d) (1976), which was
amended and incorporated by reference into Section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(1) (1976), requires the disclosure of specified proxy-like information, including whether control is sought,
within 10 days after a party acquires beneficial ownership by any means of more than 5% of
any class of registered equity securities. This is a post-acquisition disclosure requirement designed to give notice that another entity has gained such a position as to pose a threat to the
issuer of potential acquisition. However, this section is not applicable to a tender offer.
Section 14(d)(1) requires disclosure concurrent with the offer announcement in that instance.
The second section amended by the Williams Act, Section 13(e), 15 U.S.C. §78m(e) (1976),
authorizes the SEC to regulate corporate reacquisition of their own securities. The final
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 added Section 14(f), 15 U.S.C. §78n(f)
(1976), which required proxy-like disclosure when successful outsiders plan to replace a
majority of the board of directors without conducting a shareholders meeting.
56. The original proposition to require 20 days prior notice to the issuer was replaced
with the provisions of §14(d)(1) mandating concurrent disclosure. This approach preserves the offeror's mantle of secrecy and advantage of surprise up to the announcement of
the offer, but once the offer has been made, offerees and target management have immediate
access to relevant information about the offeror in assessing a decision to tender or, in the
case of management, in deciding to acquiesce in or to oppose the transaction. See note 1,
supra. The language of this subsection narrows the application of disclosure requirements to
those offerors who after consummation of the transaction would directly or indirectly be the
beneficial owners of more than 5% of the target's equity securities. Tender offers for less than
5%, of the outstanding equity securities presumably would not have take-over connotations.
Viewed in conjunction with similar disclosure requirements in §13(d), which must be made
within 10 days after acquiring 5% of the outstanding equity securities by any means, §14(d)
appears to represent Congressional recognition of the speed of the tender offer compared to
other forms of corporate takeovers governed by §13(d) and to constitute an attempt to militate
against abuse of the technique. See Moylan, supra note 11, at 558-59; Note, supra note 2, at
1257.
57. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(5) (1976). Shareholders are permitted to withdraw their deposited
securities during the first 7 days of an offer, or after 60 days if the offeror has not returned
their securities or finalized the transaction. This provision grants a measure of control to
offerees and allows time for reconsideration of the offer and trend of market conditions. It
also prevents a loss of possession for a protracted period of time, one of the perceived evils
of the conventional tender offer.
58. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(6) (1976). If the securities tendered exceed the number desired by
the offeror, this subsection provides for pro rata acceptance of tendered securities which are
deposited within 10 days of the initial tender offer announcement. This system would also
operate in the instance of shares tendered in response to an increase in price announcement,
rather than the initial offer announcement, if they exceeded the number desired.
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whether tendered before or after the announced increase.5 9 Finally,6 0 section
61
14(e) is the general anti-fraud provision applicable to tender offers.

JudicialConstructionof the Act's Purpose
Judicial interpretation of the purpose of the Williams Act has been made
in the context of challenges to conventional tender offers during which there
was a failure to properly disclose all required information within the prescribed
time limits. 62 While such factual situations do not raise the question of what
constitutes a tender offer, the court's interpretation of the Congressional purpose is relevant as a base upon which a viable definition of the term can be
constructed.6s

The Second Circuit in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp.6 4 was the first appellate court to consider the purpose of the Williams
59. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(7) (1976).
60. The other provisions of the Act are basically mechanistic provisions for applying the
Act. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(2) (1976) contains a statutory definition of "person." 15 U.S.C.
§78n(d)(3) (1976) contains the mechanics for calculating the triggeriing percentage of the
securities sought. The figure upon which the percentage calculation is made consists of the
total of the outstanding securities of that class exclusive of those held by the issuer or a
subsidiary. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(4) (1976) contains a delegation of power to the SEC to regulate
post-announcement recommendations of acceptance or rejection of the offer. 15 U.S.C.
§78n(d)(8) (1976) sets out exceptions from the application of section 14(d) for (a) those whose
acquisitions over 12 months did not exceed 2% of the outstanding securities, (b) reacquiring
issuers, and (c) those that the SEC shall exempt as having made an offer without intending
to acquire or affect control of the issuer.
61. 15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1976). This section is similar to Section 10(b) Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1972), in that it is
addressed to use of misleading statements, fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices in
connection with any tender offer. Its scope is broader than that of §14(d) and SEC Rule lOb-5
because it applies to all tender offers without standing restrictions such as allowing only those
who have purchased or sold securities in connection with the alleged fraudulent behavior.
Compare Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952) with Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controis Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969). See also Note supra note 2, at 1259-60; Note, Cash Tender Offers: Judicial Interpretation of Section 14(e), 23 CLEv. STATE L. REV. 262, 262 (1974).
62. In general, plaintiffs have alleged technical omissions or inaccurate disclosures made
by the offeror in the various forms required to be filed under §13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78m(d)(1) (1976). See generally Missouri Portland Cement Co.
v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1976); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Son, Inc., 488
F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972).
63. The purpose of the Act can be viewed as the constant theme of the legislation and
the various subsections enacted are but motifs designed to fulfill the statutory purpose. Since
the definition of tender offer defines the scope of the Act, any definition must comport with
the legislation's central purpose in order to avoid being over- or under-inclusive. Cf. Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (classifying the neutrality of the tender offer provisions as a mere characteristic of the single purpose of the Act, rather than a purpose in
itself).
64. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). This was the first action to place the provisions of the
Williams Act before a circuit court of appeals. The plaintiffs, a tendering stockholder and the
target corporation, sought to divest the offeror of acquired stock and also requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the offeror from voting the stock. The Second Circuit, Judge
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Act, in the context of the scope of standing to assert a violation of its provisions.
The court's conclusion, subsequently adopted in most circuits, 65 was that the
primary focus of congressional interest and concern was the effect of the tender
offer technique on the public shareholder. 66 The Second Circuit found that the
Williams Act was designed to insure that the public shareholder had the benefit of both a full disclosure statement from the offeror and an explanation from
the incumbent management upon which to make his investment decision.67
Standing, therefore, would be broadly granted to include the tendering stockholder, the non-tendering stockholder, and the target corporation represented
by its management. 8 However, the court suggested a standing limitation by
noting that "honesty and fair dealing" were sought by the statute, 69rather than
development of a weapon for incumbent management's protection.
The Supreme Court adopted the substance and tone of the Second Circuit's
opinion in Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau.7 However, the Court also sought
to preserve the viability of the tender offer technique by conditioning injunctive relief on a showing of irreparable harm to the challenger arising from the
71
offeror's violation of the Act.
72
This interpretation was affirmed in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, InC.
but with a change in emphasis. The Court, in considering a defeated offeror's
right of action under section 14(e), closely analyzed the economic and historical

Friendly writing for the majority, held that both the non-tendering stockholder and the
target corporation had standing to sue under §14(d)-(f). However, on the facts the court
sustained the rulings of the lower court against the plaintiffs and lifted the injunction.
65. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 397 (8th Cir. 1976); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453
F.2d 709, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan
American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085 (5th Cir. 1970).
66. 409 F.2d at 945. But see GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). The Second Circuit expanded the purpose of §13(d) to include
alerting the marketplace, not merely target investors, to the large, rapid aggregation of
securities which may show a potential shift in corporate control. Id. at 717.
67. 409 F.2d at 945.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 948.
70. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
71. The action was brought by the target corporation under §13(d) upon the offeror's
failure to file a timely schedule 13D disclosure statement with the SEC. While the Seventh
Circuit dealt harshly with this infraction, by denying the acquired stock voting rights, based
upon their perception of the need to protect and alert the marketplace as declared in GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, the Supreme Court reversed the remedy, noting that the tender offer provisions were not designed as a management weapon. The Supreme Court agreed with the
conclusion that investor protection was the paramount interest but decided that since only
a minor infraction had occurred and irreparable damage was not threatened, injunctive relief
could not be granted. 354 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (7th
Cir. 1974), revd, 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975).
72. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The target company was successful in defeating the offeror's attempt to gain control by consummating a merger with a friendly third company, or "White
Knight". The defeated offeror alleged violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Act, §14(e),
and sought damages plus injunctive relief against the successfully merged parties in the
form of suspension of voting rights for 5 years. Id.
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origins of the Williams Act, as well as its legislative history and purpose. 73
Under the Court's analysis, the apparent Congressional intention to maintain
neutrality in federal regulation of contests for corporate control was not a
legislative "purpose", but merely a "characteristic" of a body of legislation
directed toward a single overriding purpose.7 4 That purpose was to protect
investors confronted with a tender offer by compelling detailed disclosure to
them of the offeror's intentions and financial arrangements. 5 Therefore,
neutrality in the application of the Act was only relevant to the extent that it
protected the shareholder.76 Accordingly, the Court held that a defeated offeror
did not have standing to assert that the target corporation violated the Williams Act. 77 With this basic interpretation of Congressional intent in mind,
analysis of various approaches to the definition of "tender offer" which have
been proposed since the Act's passage, and development of a comprehensive
definition is feasible.
SEC

AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFINION

SEC Action
As previously noted, Congress did not define "tender offer" for the purposes
of the Williams Act.78 However, it did provide in subsection 14(d)(8) for the
Securities and Exchange Commission to exempt "by rules or regulations or by
order [any tender offer which is] not entered into for the purpose of, and not
having the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of [the Act]." 79 In effect
Congress delegated to the SEC the authority to develop a definition, at least in
the negative sense of defining non-offensive tender offers, either piecemeal by
order or summarily by rule.80 The SEC has done little to exercise its power.
Although the Commission contemplated rulemaking in 1974, it decided,
after investigation, that it would be inappropriate to do so given the dynamic
73. Id. at 22-29.
74. Id. at 29.
75. Id. at 35.
76. Id. While the Court quotes their decision in Rondeau, it is interesting to note that
they ignore the dicta in that decision regarding the Act's neutrality and its avoidance of
tipping the balance in favor of one party. This is a distinct change in emphasis. See note 71
supra.
77. 430 U.S. at 35-37. The Court noted that the neutrality aspects of the Act were designed to protect investors but not to confer new and important rights upon the class of
participants in tender offers whose activities originally prompted the legislation's enactment.
Id.
78. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
79. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(8) (1976).
80. Securities regulation statutes invariably are framework legislation with broad administrative powers granted to fill in the necessary details in order to effectuate the congressional purpose. Since the incentives are high for creative thinking in contests for corporate control, flexibility, in order to prevent circumvention, is a necessity. By resort to either
rulemaking or order, the SEC may provide the requisite flexibility. On the other hand, a
failure of the SEC to take any action only encourages participants to attempt to skirt the
spirit if not the letter of the law. See generally Swanson, supra note 14, at 520-21.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 2
1979]

CASH TENDER OFFERS: DEFINITION

nature of acquisition techniques in the marketplace. 8 ' Its position remains the
same today.8 2 The SEC's rationale for refraining from clarifying the Act's scope
has been that the need for flexibility, in light of the potential for development
of new tactics, was too great for recourse to a strict threshold definition. However, the Commission dearly indicated in its comments to the proposed rules
that it considered the term to include purchasing programs beyond what is
envisioned in the conventional tender offer. 3 This interpretation has been
maintained in various no-action letters issued by the SEC since the Act's
passage. But due to the ambiguities and piecemeal character of this procedure,
few substantive criteria can be ascertained.8 4
On the other hand, in a single definitive action only a month after the
Williams Act became effective, the SEC announced that special bids, a stock
market procedure designed to permit the purchase of blocks of securities too
large to be handled normally on the floor, would be considered a tender offer
within the meaning of the Williams Act.8 5 Although the special bid is, in
81. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5526, 5 S.E.C. 115 (Sept. 9, 1974). The
Commission instituted a fact finding investigation into various tender offer issues, including
the scope of the Williams Act. Approximately two years later, the Commission explicitly declined to define the term "tender offer." See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5731,
10 S.E.C. 143, 145; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12676 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. EPi.

(CCH 80,659 at 86,695-96 (Aug. 2, 1976).

82. The 1976 decision has been recently affirmed by the Commission's withdrawal of its
1976 proposed rules and the republication, for comment, of new proposed rules. See SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-155548 (Feb. 5, 1979) 489 SEc. RE. & L. REP. 7 (BNA)
(Special supplement, Feb. 7, 1979). But see Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1979, at 18, Col. 1.
The Journal xeports that the SEC has asked its staff to draft a rule defining a tender offer.
Although it was not clear why the SEC changed its position within five months of releasing
its new proposed rules on tender offers which declined to develop a definition, this decision
was announced nine days after the court's decision in Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
83. Id. See also [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 180,659 at 86,695-96
(Aug. 2, 1976); Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer": An
Analysis of Judicial and Administrative Interpretationsof the Term, 23 N.Y. LAw Sc-. L.

RLv. 379, 380 (1978). In recent court actions the SEC has urged that eight factors should be
considered in determining whether a defendant's activities constituted a tender offer. "They
are whether there is active and widespread solicitation of shareholders; whether the solicitation is made for a large percentage of the issuer's stock; whether there is a premium offered
over market price; whether the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; whether
the offer is contingent on tender of a fixed number of shares; whether the offer is open for a
limited period of time; whether the offerees are subjected to pressure to sell their stock; and
whether public announcements of a purchasing program precede or accompany a rapid
accumulation." Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 447 F. Supp. 773, (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. at 823-24.
84. See Yellow Freight [1972-1973 Tranfer Binder] Fa. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) f178,192
(Avail. Dec. 15, 1972); Cattlemen's Investment Co. [1971-1972 Txansfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) ff78,588 (Dec. 17, 1971); Cargill Inc. and Missouri Portland Cement Co. [19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) f180,050 (Avail. Oct. 31, 1974).
85. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8392 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 77,715 (Aug. 30, 1968). See American Stock Exch. Rule 391(c), NYSE GuME
(CCH) 3291 (1973). The typical procedure is as follows: A purchaser, through an Exchange
member, announces a special bid on the market tape, specifying the number of shares desired
and fixing the price, which is usually substantially above the current market price. The bidder
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essence, simply a tender offer effected through an open market transaction" as

opposed to a privately negotiated transaction, the Commission's decision indicates its willingness to look at the substance and effect of a purchasing program rather than its mechanistic form.s ' The clear implication is that the Commission does not feel constrained to limit the definition of "tender offer" to
include only the traditionally conceived technique. This has not been entirely
true of the judicial approach to the term.
JudicialDevelopment
To date, only a handful of cases have arisen in which the courts have had
to squarely face the issue of when nonmarket purchase programs constitute cash
tender offers. The first of these decisions, Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,""
held that the active and widespread solicitation of shareholders by mail, telephone and personal visits, directed toward the purchase of shares in an effort to
acquire corporate control, contained all the potential dangers which section
14(d) sought to alleviate and thus constituted a tender offer.8 9 The action followed a five percent shareholder's attempt to gain control of the target through
solicitations by employees of his separately controlled corporation. Purchases
were made over a six week period during which the offeror doubled his holdings in the target corporation without making a preacquisition disclosure as
required by the Act. 90 Arguably, this decision stands only for the proposition
that allegedly private offers must be truly private to avoid regulation. But the
case may also, and perhaps more logically, be read as an attempt by the court
to include privately negotiated transactions within the scope of the Williams
Act if solicitation is widespread and has the potential to force shareholders
into hurried investment decisions. 9 Under such circumstances an allegedly
private transaction is pragmatically indistinguishable from the traditional
must obtain permission from the Exchange and is required to pay a special commission to
members of the Exchange completing a transaction pursuant to the bid. The special bid
usually remains open for a minimum of 15 minutes. See also Moylan, supra note 11, at 569;
Note, supra note 2, at 1261.
86.

See E. ARANOW

& H.

EINHORN, supranote 15, at 71.

87. The SEC was officially silent as to its reasons for inclusion of the special bid within
the scope of §14(d). However, the similarities between the conventional tender offer and the
special bid are apparent. Both involve an announcement made to all shareholders of a public
company, for acquisition of a specified number of shares at a fixed premium price, to be
purchased on a first-come-first-served basis until the block is acquired. There is little or no
advance notice and the identity of the bidder remains undisclosed. Conceptually, it is an
excellent device for obtaining a large block of stock, but the bid may lack both the audience
and the duration necessary for the bidder to gain control as in a tender offer. See Moylan,
supra note 11, at 569-70; Note, supra note 2, at 1261-63, Note, supra note 13, at 390.
88. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per stip., No. C 72-152 (W.D. Okla, May
8, 1972).
89. 343 F. Supp. at 1252.
90. Id. at 1250.

91. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 72; E. ARANow, H. E1NHORN, &
G. BERsrEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 3 (1977); Einhorn &
Blackburn, supra note 83, at 384. Cf. SEC Rule 146(c), 17 C.F.R. §230.146(c) (limitations
on the manner of offerings made under §4(2) Securities Act of 1933 are very similar).
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tender offer and logically should be subject to regulation.92 While the Court

rejected the conventional conceptualization as a limitation on the meaning of
93
"tender offer," it did not undertake to formulate any general definition.
Therefore the decision is of limited value, and can only be considered to have
identified threshold characteristics of a purchasing program, (1) active, wide-

spread solicitation and (2) intent to acquire control, which if present, would
trigger closer judicial scrutiny of the program's overall effect in order to determine whether the Williams Act is applicable.
Approximately a year later in Nachman Corp. v. HaIlfred, Inc.,94 the central
issue was whether a purchase program directed at a small and powerful group

of shareholders, rather than a large group as in Cattlemen's, fell within the
coverage of the Williams Act. 95 The court adopted the test that "any offer to
purchase securities likely to pressure shareholders into making uninformed and
illconsidered decisions"96 should be within the coverage of the Act. However,

according to this test, the court found no need to apply the Act to the circumstances of the case. 97 Significant factors in this decision were the small number
and sophistication of the shareholders contacted. 9 Further, the court's presumption of the solicited shareholders' insulation from pressure was borne out
by the facts of the case. The solicitees resisted the initial offers and managed
to negotiate the price upward, a hallmark characteristic of a truly private
negotiated transaction. 99 In sum, three propositions emerge from Nachman:
(1) if the impact of the program would generate pressure on the shareholder to
make uninformed, hasty decisions, the program will be considered a tender
offer; (2) the small number and sophistication of the shareholders contacted
raises a rebuttable presumption of their ability to withstand such pressure and
vitiates the inherent impact of the program; (3) the negotiability of the offer is
a key factor in rebutting or affirming the presumption of insulation from the
inherent pressure of the challenged program.
92. But see E. ARANow, H.

ENHORaN, &-G.BER=IN, supra note 91, at 2.
93. See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 140; Note, supra note 2, at 1266.
94. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1194,455 (N.D. Ill.
July 13, 1973),
dismissed with prejudice, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CC) f94,799 (N.D.
Ill.
1974) (settlement).
95. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCHI) [94,799 at 95,590.
96. Id. See Note, supra note 2, at 1281.
97. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. Smc. L. REt,. (CCH) f94,455 at 95,592. The offeror
bought 30% of Nachman stock from another corporation which had been ordered to divest
itself of the stock pursuant to an antitrust decree. Because the offeror was not satisfied with
its voice in management, it sought to buy out the board members and eyecutive officers over

a period of several months. Out of 600 stockholders, the offeror had contact with some 40
and succeeded in purchasing from 14. The price was negotiated up and down during these
transactions, and further, there was no set price or time-limitation imposed. Id. at 95,591-92.
98. Id. See also Einhorn & Blackburn, supra note 83, at 383; SEC Rule 146(d), 17 C.F.R.
§230.146(d) (sets out the same factors for the nature of offerees to whom a private offering
may be made under §4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933).
99. E. ARANow, H. EmHORN, & G. B sR=SEm, supra note 91, at 2. The court may have
been incorrect in its analysis of the "impact test" in that both the test and the Act were
designed with the small public investor in mind, and application to directors, officers and
majority shareholders was never intended. Moylan, supra note 11, at 578-79.
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In the third case to consider the definitional problem of the Williams Act,
D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway,100 the impact of a solicitation program upon
allegedly sophisticated offerees was analyzed in an attempt to determine the
applicability of the Act.' 0' The court found that the "impact test" adopted in
Nachman was too broad, 10 2 based in part upon its reluctance to extend the
concept of "tender offer" beyond its traditional meaning. 0 3 The case arose out
of a program involving telephone canvassing of some two dozen sophisticated
offerees which resulted in four actual purchases from financial institutions,
none of whom joined in the complaint. 04 The court assumed that institutional
investors were insulated from pressure, and this presumption was borne out by
the fact that so few institutions actually sold.105 Again the characteristics of a
privately negotiated transaction were present; piecemeal offers were made over
a three month period to a small number of shareholders on an equal footing
with the offeror.106 It is difficult to separate the court's reluctance to expand the
meaning of "tender offer" from the weakness of the case on its facts.107 However, the reasoning of the court affirms both the scope of the solicitation and
the presumption of sophistication of the offerees as determinative factors in
ascertaining the applicability of the Act.
These factors also appear to have been persuasive in an unreported decision,
o
Loews Corp. v. Accident & Casualty Insurance Co., 10
in which the court apparently ruled that widespread publication of a future intent to make a tender
offer can render the prospective offeror's current, otherwise routine market
activity subject to Williams Act regulation. In Loews, private and open market
purchases, which followed the defendant's announcement of future plans to
make a conventional tender offer, were held to constitute a tender offer under
the Williams Act. 09 However, the reasoning of this court is somewhat unclear.
The findings of fact indicate widespread publicity of the defendant's intention
to purchase a large percentage of shares and that a large number were in fact
purchased, but no mention was made of the purchasing method utilized.110
100. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 194,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
101. See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 143.
102. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1194,771 at 96,563. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
103. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1194,771 at 96,562.
104. Id. The phone calls were somewhat informal involving queries about stockholder
attitude toward management and toward a possible special meeting of stockholders. Id. at
96,563.
105. See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 141-42.
106. Cf. Contreras v. Tweedy Browne & Knapp, 76 F.R.D. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The
Contrerascourt held that a purchase from two shareholders of 26% of the issuer's stock, which
gave working control to a "market maker," was not a tender offer but rather a private stock
purchase. Id. at 44-45.
107. The court stated that the activities included nothing characteristic of a tender offer.
Given this factual conclusion, it is not difficult to understand why the court declined to expand the tender offer concept to include these actions. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1194,771 at 96,562.
108. No. 74 C 1396 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1974).
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id.at 5-6.
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The court then concluded, as a matter of law, that the purchase exerted undue
pressure upon the shareholders and that the totality of the program constituted
a tender offer within the meaning of the Williams Act.11 However, in granting
relief, the court inexplicably enjoined only other than open market purchases,1 12 despite the plaintiff's arguments which emphasized the defendant's
open market purchases as being a tender offer in violation of the Act."8 This
decision, while of limited value, reaffirms that (1) publicity, however made,
of an intention to purchase a number of shares in excess of the triggering percentage found in subsection 14(d)(1) of the Act 14 and (2) potential pressure on
the shareholder-1 5 are two major factors to be considered in deciding whether
solicitation activity constitutes a tender offer.
Another factor to be considered by the judiciary was identified in Leighton
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.- 6 The Leighton court attached significance to whether other statutory protections invoked by a transaction would
serve as adequate protection to the stockholder without resort to application of
the Williams Act." 7 The case concerned an allegation that a management proposal to eliminate mandatory preemptive rights, which was forwarded to stock-

holders in a proxy request, in reality constituted a proposal to shareholders to
tender their shares.":" While finding that the scope of the Williams Act, particularly section 14(e), extended beyond the so called conventional tender offer
battle for control, the court observed that it was not unlimited and was therefore not necessarily applicable to all large transfers of stock ownership." 9 The
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 11-12.

113. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 36,
Loew's Corp. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 74 C 1396 (N.D. IM. July 11, 1974).
114. See E. ARANOW, H. E.NHORN, & G. BER.STEIN, supra note 91, at 7-8; Einhorn &
Blackburn, supranote 83, at 387.
115. Block &Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 142.
116. 397 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
117. Id. at 141.
118. Id. at 140. The proxy statement was sent by AT&T in connection with a stockholders'
meeting in which a vote was to be taken on eliminating mandatory preemptive rights. In
accordance with New York's statutory appraisal xights, the company would offer the shareholder the fair value of their stock as of the day prior to the meeting. Id. at 136.
119. Id. at 140-41. By way of example, the court cited two supportive decisions. In Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974),
the Fifth Circuit addressed, peripherally, the scope of §14(d) and the purpose of the Williams
Act. Pursuant to a merger agreement between Pearl Brewing and Southdown Corp., Pearl
stockholders were allowed to sell approximately 45% of their newly acquired Southdown
shares for $45 each if presented within a ten day period. The corporations were seeking a tax
free merger and the stockholders were advised by mail of the price, the cutoff date, and
where to send their certificates. Plaintiff missed the deadline and his tender was rejected. As
did the Leighton court, the Fifth Circuit found that the ingredients of a typical tender offer
were not absolute requirements for application of the Williams Act. However, going further,
they held that the letter at issue contained more ingredients found in a "conventional" tender
offer than were present in either a special bid or the program in Cattlemen's Investment Co.,
both of which had been declared subject to the Act. See note 88 supra and accompanying
text. Significant aspects to the court were that the price was set at a premium, the offer was
for a set number of shares, deposit of shares until consummation of merger was required, and
a risk existed that stock would be wreurned u nagcepted. 489 F.2d at 597 n.22. Thus, the Fifth
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need for stockholder protection in making fundamental investment decisions
was recognized as the primary concern of the Act, and the court found that the
statutory appraisal rights which were invoked by the proxy request served as
adequate protection.120 Therefore, giving the statute its broadest construction
consistent with its remedial purpose, it held that the proposal did not constitute
a tender offer.' 2' This case reflects the importance of actual shareholder need
for protection, in light of other applicable federal and state statutory protections, as a principle consideration in determining whether a transaction is
within the scope of the Williams Act.' 22
In 1978 three cases were handed down dealing with the scope of the Williams Act as a function of the definition of tender offer. While reinforcing the
reasoning of previous cases, these decisions still did not provide a generic
definition for adoption.
1 23
Generally, the decision in FinancialGeneral Bank Shares, Inc. v. Lance
tracts the reasoning of Cattlemen's,24 D-Z 12 5 and Nachman, 26 by finding that

the facts of the case had the earmarks of a series of private transactions rather
than a tender offer subject to section 14(d)..7 The court took note of the lack
of widespread solicitation, the small number and sophistication of shareholders
contacted, and the fact that the primary reason for selling was dissatisfaction
with present management which tended to negate the presence of undue
offeror pressure.

28

The complaint did not, as a result of these determinations,

Circuit held that the mailing procedure constituted a tender offer, and that the presence or
lack of management opposition to an offer was irrelevant to such determination. The second
decision cited by the Leighton court in its discussion of the limits of the Act was Corenco
Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973). In this case, the trial court dismissed a claim that the
defendant's mere announcement of a tender offer in the Wall Street Journal itself constituted
a tender offer which should have contained a complete §14(d) disclosure. The Second Circuit,
affirming the lower court, held that since the announcement expressly disclaimed making an
offer and required the shareholder to obtain the official printed offer prior to submitting
his stock, the announcement was not a tender offer. Consequently, it did not have to comply
with the Act. 488 F.2d at 215.
120. 397 F. Supp. at 141.
121. Id.
122. See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 142.
123. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,403 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978) rehearing denied,
[1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) [96,511 (D.D.C. July 30, 1978).
124. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
126. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
127. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f96,403 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978) at 93,429. As in
Nachman, the instant court found that privately negotiated transactions at premium prices,
without more, did not constitute a tender offer. Id.
128. Id. The court's extensive summary of its findings reveals that over a period of two
months, three investment counselors and lawyers, retained by several Middle Eastern customers,
actively sought purchases in a series of offers, at various prices, to between 10 and 30 target
shareholders while simultaneously conducting open market purchases. The agents were not
uniformly successful in their bids. However, in at least two instances major shareholders,
dissatisfied with the management, contacted the purchasing agents on their own initiative and
sales were consummated. Id. at 93,421-24.
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survive a motion for summary judgment.1 29 However, the court did recognize
several criteria offered by the plaintiff as useful in determining whether the
purchasing program constituted a tender offer.130 The characteristics acknowledged by the court were:
Solicitation made to a substantial number of shareholders and for a
substantial percentage of the target corporation's stock; offered at a
premium over the current market price; pressure exerted on the shareholders of the target corporation by the purchasing program; and limited
about the tender offer and
information available to the shareholders
131
limited time for deciding whether to sell.
This was the most explicit component definition in any judicial opinion prior
-to that of Wellman and although not expressly adopted by the court, it provided an excellent checklist for the formulation of a generic definition.
Following Lance, a more cautious approach was taken by the Second Circuit
32
in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. It is significant that while
the court saw no immediate reason to expand the term tender offer beyond its
conventional meaning, they did not foreclose the taking of such a step given the
proper case. 33 The precedential value of the decision is somewhat clouded by
the intermingling of the court's stated reluctance to expand the conventional
34
One of the conmeaning of the term and the factual weakness of the case.
on the offerees,
exerted
pressure
the
Act,
of
concerns
sistently identified prime
[1978] FE. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,511 (D.D.C. July 30, 1978) at 93,994.
180. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,403 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978) at 93,429.
131. Id. See also Plaintiff's Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief at 55, [1978] FE. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,403 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978).
129.

132. 449 F. Supp. 951 (S-D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, [1978]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1978).
133. Id. at 94,361-62. The court approvingly cited D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, see

note 99 supra and accompanying text, in rejecting the plaintiff's position that a unique method
of stock acquisition which exerts pressure on stockholders to make ill-considered and uninformed investment decisions should be treated as a tender offer under §14(d) and (e). Id. at
94,361. The court also rejected the contention that whenever a purchaser of stock intends to
acquire and exercise control of a company it should be subject to the provisions of the Act.
Id. at 94,362.
134. The case was a direct result of an on-going proxy contest begun by Curtiss-Wright
Corp. for control of Kennecott Copper Corp. While attackiing Curtiss-Wright's proxy materials, Kennecott also alleged that Curtiss-Wright's quiet acquisition of some 9.9% of
Kennecott's outstanding shares over a three and a half month period was a tender offer in
violation of §14(d) of the Williams Act. Curtiss-Wright purchased 3,287,400 shares of
Kennecott on 43 trading days during that period. On 17 of these days, Curtiss-Wright's
purchases exceeded 50% of the daily volume of trading on the New York Stock Exchange.
While substantially all of the stock was acquired on the New York Stock Exchange and other
national securities exchanges, several transactions were not ordinary market purchases. White,
Weld & Co. Curtiss-Wright's broker, solicited 50 Kennecott shareholders off the floor of the
exchange, consummating sales with willing sellers on the floor of the exchange. Further,
Salomon Brothers, another Curtiss-Wright broker, solicited approximately a dozen institutional holders of Kennecott, consummating an unspecified number of sales off the exchange.
449 F. Supp. at 961. Cf. note 106, supra. (No need to expand tender offer definition to include
acquisitions that do not exhibit characteristics of a tender offer.)
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was admitted by the plaintiff to be absent in this instance. 1 5 No premium was
offered and no deadline for decision set to hasten the transaction131 Moreover,
the acquisitions did not have significant market impact which would tend to
generate speculative decisions to sell, due to the extended period over which
the open market purchases were made. Further, only a dozen institutional investors with adequate sophistication to genuinely negotiate were solicited for
sales. This limited number may have been a factor in the court's determination.
Because of these factual deficiencies in the plaintiff's case, the decision offers
only minor support to arguments against expansion of the traditional definition
to include unconventional programs which have the same effect as a tender
7
offer.13
On the other hand, the opinion highlights a number of important aspects
of the Second Circuit's approach to the problem: (1) the court will be disinclined to expand the conventional definition in the absence of compelling circumstance; 18 (2) the mere fact that institutional investors are contacted individually directly does not give rise to an inference that pressure was exerted or
that a public offer was made; 3 9 (3) the presence or absence of pressure is significant, if not crucial, to a determination that the Act is applicable;140 (4) a transaction, to which the substantive provisions of the Act relating to "deposit requirements" would be inapplicable, will be presumed to fall outside the Congressional intent to regulate. On this point, the court reasoned that while the
parameters of a tender offer are unclear, Congress did provide a series of
statutory provisions which substantively regulate unique characteristics of
transactions considered to be tender offers. The court further reasoned that if
all transactions which Congress intended to be regulated possess these characteristics then a transaction lacking these characteristics is not to be regulated.
The resultant postulate would be that if a transaction does not trigger the
relevant substantive provisions of the Act, sections 14(d)(5)-(7), then it cannot be
a tender offer. 14' While it is the only appellate decision to date which has given
primary consideration to the definitional problems of the Act, the Kennecott
decision should not be considered dispositive of the issue.
In the final 1978 case, S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co.,' 4 2 the
target company successfully argued that the defendant's purchasing program
constituted an unconventional tender offer subject to the provisions of the

135. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1978) at 94,362.
136. Id. at 94,360-61. See also 449 F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (trial court opinion).
137. 475 F. Supp. at 826. See [1978] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 196,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28,
1978) at 94,362. See also Pretrial Brief of Plaintiffs, Becton, Dickinson & Co. at 24, 29, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Pretrial Brief of Securities Exchange
Commission at 37, 51. Id.
138. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff96,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1978) at 94,362.
139. Id. The court relied upon Financial Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, see note 122 supra
and accompanying text, and Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., see note 92 supra and accompanying text.
140. [1978] Fm. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,565 at 94,362.
141. Id. at 94,361.
142. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,750 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1978).
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Williams Act. 43 The court was persuaded by the reasoning of Cattlemen's'44
and Nachman145 that methods of acquisition other than the conventional tender
offer fall within the purview of the Act if they engender the same pressures and
dangers inherent in conventional tender offers.146
The court distinguished previous decisions from the case before it, on the
ground that the purchases at issue had been consummated after substantially
detailed and widespread public announcements had been made by the defendants. 147 The fact that such announcements were couched in conditional
language was found not to obviate the need of the public shareholder for protection.2
' 4 Further, it is significant that the purchases involved in S-G Securities
were made from presumably sophisticated holders of large blocks of target
stock. 49 The court concluded that where there is:
1) a publicly announced intention by the purchaser to acquire a substantial block of the stock of the target company for purposes of acquiring control thereof; and
143. Id. at 94,936.
144. See note 88 supraand accompanying text.
145. See note 93 supraand accompanying text.
146. After an unsuccessful attempt to conduct a friendly tender offer for S-G Securities
shares, Fuqua Investment Co. sought to obtain a controlling block of S-G stock through a
series of privately negotiated transactions and purchases on the American Stock Exchange.
The rejection of the proposal and Fuqua's intentions to pursue the matter were announced
by both corporations in news releases which resulted in speculative buying. Fuqua's purchases
were made in five large blocks during an eleven day period within a month and a half of the
initial announcements. [1978] FED. SEC. L. RP'. (CCII) 196,750 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1978) at
94,930-31, 94,935-36.
147. Id. at 94,935. The court specifically took note of Kennecott, Lance, D-Z, and Nachman, but did not make note of the decision in Loews Corp. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co.,
No. 74 C 1396 (N.D. 11M.
July 11, 1974). See text accompanying note 107 supra. The Loews
decision, although cryptic, would lend support to the court's distinction, since the fact of
publicity prior to purchase was crucial to the determination that a tender offer had been
made. Id. at 8. See also E. ARANOW, H. ETmHORN, & G. BERISrEN, supra note 91, at 7-8.
148. Id. at 94,936. The court relied heavily upon Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v.
Milgo Electronic Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), involving public announcements
made in a conventional exchange tender offer. The court in Applied Digital found that the
protections of the Williams Act were triggered at the time that the announcements were
made, and not later. Whether conditional or not, the announcements were perceived as
engendering the very dangers the Act sought to mitigate. 425 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
149. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,750 at 94,931. Most transactions, while negotiated
privately, took place on the open market and consisted of large block purchases of S-G stock.
The first block sale was consummated with the offeror's principal agent and his family, the
second with a limited partnership, and the third with a risk arbitrage firm which had been
purchasing on the market after the initial public announcements were made on the Dow
Jones Broad Tape and in the Wall Street Journal. The fourth sale was executed by four
brokers on the American Stock Exchange, pursuant to the Exchange's clean-up rules, and the
fifth was consummated approximately a week later with various brokers in New York, Florida
and Georgia. The final purchase was from a senior vice-president of a brokerage firm and his
brother, who had been purchasing S-G stock on the market in speculation since the date of
the first public announcement. Indirectly, a large number of persons were affected, despite the
small number of transactions actually made directly with the offeror and the sophistication of
the sellers. Id. at 94,931.
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2) a subsequent rapid acquisition by the purchaser of large blocks of
stock through open market and privately negotiated purchases; such
actions constitute a tender offer for purposes of §14(d) of the statute. 150
While this conclusion is stated in broad terms, it provides a good framework
for development of a more particular generic or threshold definition.
In sum, the significant factors emphasized by the courts in determining
whether an unconventional tender offer has been made are: (1) the extent of
solicitation: whether systematic, widespread and active, 15' or private and
sporadic;52 (2) whether the manner of the solicitation was such as to exert
pressure on a potential seller by conventional tender offer techniques, such as
limitation on decisional time frame, fixed premium price, deposit provisions,
or similar requirements;'53 (3) the character of solicited shareholders as a gauge
of actual need for the statute's protection:15 whether presumably insulated from
offeror pressure, such as a small and powerful insider group, 5 5 major or
institutional holders,156 or more vulnerable, such as the small public investor;' 57
(4) whether there is evidence of actual negotiation despite pressure or sophistication;1 5s (5) whether the substantive provisions, sections 14(d)(5)-(8), of the Act
150. Id. at 94,986.
151. See S-G Securities Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co., [1978] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCII)
1196,750 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1978) at 94,936. Cf. Loews Corp. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co.,
No. 74 C 1396 at 8 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1974). (Publicity was an important factor to court, but
opinion does not clearly state how widespread this was.) See also note 83 supra, SEC Factor
number 1, 8; Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972),
vacated per stip., No. C 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1978).
152. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28,
1978) at 94,361-62; Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
196,403 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978) at 93,429, afJ'd on reconsideration, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,511 (D.D.C. July 30, 1978); D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) at 96,562-63. See also Block &
Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 143.
153. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596-99 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974); S-G Securities Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co., [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1196,750 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1978) at 94,936; Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974
Txansfer Binder] FD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1194,455 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1973) at 95,591-92; SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5781, 10 S.E.C. 143, 145; SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release 12676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1180,659 at 86,695-96 (Aug.
2, 1976. See also Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 571 F.2d 1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, - U.S. -, 47 U.S.L.W. 4844 (U.S. Jun. 26, 1979); note 83 supra, SEC factors number
3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Cf. Loews Corp. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 74 C 1396 (N.D. Ill. July 11,
1974) (finding pressure but without amplification).
154. See Leighton v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 897 F. Supp. 133, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
155 See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1194,455 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1973) at 95,592.
156. See cases cited note 152 supra. But see S-G Securities Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co.,
[1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f96,750 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1978) at 94,935-36.
157. See Loews Corp. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 74 C 1396 at 8; Nachman Corp.
v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f94,455 at 95,593;
Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. at 1252.
158. Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1194,455 at 95,592.
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are mechanically applicable to a challenged program; 59 and (6) whether control of the corporation is the aim of the offeror. 160 Guided by scholarly suggestion and the congressional purpose articulated in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,161 it is possible to reduce these juridically derived characteristics
to a useful definition of "tender offer."
SUGGESTED DEFINIION AS A PROPOSED SEC RIEGULATION

Although the courts, as shown, have been developing a "tender offer"
definition, they are, by the nature of their decision-making process, ill-suited
for the task of comprehensively defining the term. Courts are bound by the
facts of the case before them and cannot stray too far from those facts in making
a decision.16 2 The SEC, on the other hand, is much better equipped to pronounce a generic, working definition through its rule-making process. 1 63 There
exists a need for a generic definition to be used as a planning tool for persons
contemplating an acquisition program as well as for those arranged in opposition.216 Therefore, it is suggested that the Commission adopt the following rule:

159. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., [1978] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH)
96,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1978) at 94,362-63.
160. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d at 599; Cattlemen's Investment Co. v.
Fears, 343 F. Supp. at 1251. Cf. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 476
F.2d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 1973) (intention to gain control is a material disclosure). See also note
83, supra, SEC factor number 2.
161. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See text accompanying note 73 supra.
162. The term has been considered through the case-by-case approach for over a decade
and yet great uncertainty remains. This is not surprising given the factual disparities of cases
and the low probability of a single case or controversy supplying all the necessary elements
for an encompassing definition. The limitations of specific factual situations and the complexity of federal securities regulation operate against the courts' ever succeeding in this
task. Such quasi-legislative work is better performed by processes developed for that purpose.
See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 76; Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at
146-53; Einhorn & Blackburn, supra note 83, at 397; See also SEC CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE
AcQUIsmoNs 116-22, Practicing Law Institute 1971 (comments of Mr. Bauman and panel);
Moylan, supra note 11, at 588-89. Although conceptually the vagueness of the line drawn may
encourage offerors to remain a healthy distance from it, the rewards and incentives for the
clever offeror are too great to expect this to occur. Programs which violate the spirit of the Act,
yet appear to avoid the judicially declared trigger characteristics, can be tested, developed and
improved by those inclined to approach the line. In this vein, it is interesting to note that the
same stock brokerage firm, Salomon Bros., that solicited 12 investment institutions outside the
market in Kennecott Copper Corp. and survived judicial scrutiny, also conducted the telephone solicitation utilized in Sun Company's acquisition of Becton, Dickinson & Co., see notes
209-214 infra and accompanying text. See Kennecott Copper Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449
F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Pretrial Brief of Plaintiffs, Becton, Dickinson & Co. at 15,
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
163. Cf. CLC of America Inc. v. Scheuer, No. 78 C 273 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1978) cited in
Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 50, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(expansion of the concept of tender offer is a legislative function). See generally LANDs, THE
AnMimN-RATvE PRocEss 10-16 (1938); Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative Law, 34 GEo.
WMH. L. REv. 401 (1966).
164. See E. ARANow, H. EinORN, & G. BERpsrarN, supra note 91, at 2; E. ARANow &
H. EiHORN, supra note 15, at 75-76; Note, supra note 13, at 398-99.
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Rule 14-D-1, (§240.14d-1) Definitions:
a) The term "tender offer" means:
(1) Any widespread solicitation or bid program for cash or exchange conducted by an entity with the intention of gaining at least working control of
the issuer of the equity securities sought; and
(2) Directed to a substantial number of holders of the issuer's equity securities, provided however, that a solicitation of less than 35 persons shall raise
a rebuttable presumption that such purchase program is not within this definition; and
(3) For a substantial percentage of the issuer's equity securities, provided
that (A) such single acquisition program shall in the aggregate with all other
acquisitions of such class of securities during the preceding twelve months exceed 21% of that class and that (B) the offeror would be the beneficial owner
of greater than 5% of the total of such class of securities at completion; and
(4) Conducted in a manner which tends to exert pressure on the shareholders so contacted to make an uninformed or ill-considered investment decision
to present such securities for purchase, provided that the elements of the solicitation which give rise to the inference of pressure shall be considered in
light of (A) the sophistication, or lack thereof, of the offeree and (B) the applicability of any other state or federal statutory provisions which fulfill the
purpose of public investor protection.
This definition, while lengthy- s and subject to attack for the imprecision
of some of the terms used, 1 6 would provide much needed stability and yet retain flexibility in the area.1 67 Most of the concepts embodied in this rule have
an established core meaning developed in the previously discussed decisions168
Moreover, flexibility has not been sacrificed in that rebuttable presumptions
165. Since the scope of the Act depends upon deriving a definition from what is now a
complex but loosely related set of characteristics, brevity would most likely lead to material
omission or unilluminating generality. Several commentators who have sought to formulate
a more concise definition of the term have been forced to expend pages in explanation of the
other elements applicable to an understanding of the term. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
supra note 15, at 69-74; Moylan, supra note 11, at 579-84; Note, supra note 2, at 1270-81.
166. While there exists a range of meanings contained in the key words, "widespread,"
"working control," "substantial," "substantial percentage," "pressure," "informed or illconsidered," "sophistication," most of these terms have been somewhat illuminated by
judicial construction. See note 168 infra and accompanying text.
167. At the very least, the focus of the controversy would be shifted from definitional
generalities to the proper points of factual dispute, which are more narrow and by nature
the better subject for juridical disposition. A standard would be set up against which proposed or consummated actions could be analyzed consistently with concepts of due process.
Cf. Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 79-81, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (raising the defense of void for vagueness against the Williams Act).
168. See, e.g., D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) ][94,771 at 96,536 ("sophistication"); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff94,455 at 95,592 ("pressure"); Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. at 1251-52 ("widespread"). Cf. SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R.
§230.146 (1978) (many of the definitional provisions are similar and have a strong case decision development).
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and inferences are utilized which can be overcome in extreme instances. 169 The
privately Aiegotiated transfers of control not involving public solicitation,
where the parties are on equal footing, remain unregulated except to the extent that they presently involve notions of fiduciary duty. ° On the other hand,
tactics which are outside the scope of the conventional tender offer concept yet
do not constitute truly private transactions are brought under the coverage of
17
This is consistent with the Act's primary purpose: to prothe Williams ActY.
tect the public investor by providing him with otherwise unobtainable in72
formation upon which to make his decision.
Although a program fitting within the proposed definition would automatically trigger the disclosure provisions of section 14(1), the substantive provisions, sections 14(5)-(7), would only be triggered if the technique utilized resulted in the separation of ownership and control of the tendered securities
without a corresponding commitment on the offeror's part. 73 The disclosure
provisions of the Act can certainly operate independently of the substantive
provisions of the Act.1 74 To assume, as did the court in Kennecott Copper Corp.
169. The use of statutory presumptions in the adjudicatory process is widespread and
generally accepted as a valid device. See generally 1 K. HUGEm, FLORIDA EvWENcE TREATISE,
§§50-61 (1977). A presumption sets up a fairly stable threshold which, upon presentation of
credible and persuasive evidence to the contrary, can be overcome by the challenger. The use
of presumptions in the definition of "tender offer" has been widely suggested. See Block &
Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 155; Einhorn & Blackburn, supra note 83, at 397-98; Moylan,
supra note 11, at 588-89.
170. The leading decision in the area of controlling stockholder's fiduciary duties is
Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See Block &
Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 133-36; Hazen, supra note 2, at 1054.
171. Conduct that essentially is a tender offer, but does not involve a mechanistic device
such as a depository, or use of newspaper ads to transmit the offer, or some other aspect of a
traditional tender offer, would still be within the scope of the proposed definition. The control of such a program by the Williams Act regulation would be consistent with congressional purpose. See, e.g., 113 CONc. REo. 854-56 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
172. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 39-15548 (Feb. 5,
1979); 489 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2 (Special Supp. Feb. 7, 1979); S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
173. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
174. Logically, the withdrawal provisions of the Act, §14(d)(5) would be applicable only
if the deposit of shares tendered was a condition of the offer. Deposit is unnecessary for many
tender offers. See S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co., [1978] FmD. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
ff96,750 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1978). The other substantive provisions of the Act, such as §14(d)(6)
concerning acceptance of shares where the number tendered exceeds the number desired by
the offeror, are also conceptually inapplicable to many purchasing programs which nonetheless
constitute tender offers. For all tender offers disclosure in accordance with §14(d)(1) would be
required, regardless of whether a depository was used or an excess number of shares were
tendered. This requirement is for disclosure concurrent with initial announcement of the
offer, so that the investor is appraised of the relevant facts prior to making a decision to
tender. The other provisions of the Act are triggered only if certain problems develop with a
depository or an excess of shares subsequent to the decision to tender. The Act is chiefly designed to protect the investor at the decisional stage rather than later, as a focus on the substantive deposit provisions would imply. See generally Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. at 27-35; Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 146-48.
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v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,17 5 that the substantive deposit provisions define what

constitutes a tender offer by reason of their mechanical applicability would, in
effect, allow the tail to wag the dog.'7 6 As previously stated, investor protection
through relevant disclosure was the primary purpose for enactment of the
Act. 177 The deposit provisions merely attacked a collateral evil perceived by
Congress in the tender offer technique then prevalent. 78 The potential for
abuse where decisions concerning whether or not to tender must be made in
an uninformed and pressured environment was the primary focus of Congress,
and the suggested definition retains this focus without elevating collateral
issues to primary status.
Wellman v. Dickinson and the ProposedDefinition
The recent continuing litigation between the SEC, Sun Company and
Becton, Dickinson provides a back-drop for a comprehensive test of the suggested definition.'-7 The purchasing tactics utilized by Sun Company are the
most sophisticated developed to date, and raise questions as to the validity of
presumptions articulated in recent decisions. 80 For purposes of clarity, a section
by section analysis of the suggested definition against the facts of the Wellman
transaction and the interpreted Congressional purpose of the Williams Act
follows.' 8 '
The Sun Company solicitation program, by the plaintiff's calculations, involved two directors of Becton, Dickinson, a member of the founding family
without a position in the company, two long-time investment and financial
advisors to Becton, Dickinson, two funds controlling family trusts of these ad-

175. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,565 at 94,861. See note 141 supra and accompanying text. In dealing with this problem the court in Wellman v. Dickinson stated that the
Kennecott court appeared to be more concerned with creating an overlap between open
market purchases and tender offers thereby rendering §14(d)(5)-(7) unworkable, than with
stating specific characteristics of a tender offer. 475 F. Supp. at 822. This explanation is more
tenable than with the interpretation that the Kennecott court viewed §14(d)(5)-(7) as implicitly
defining the characteristics of a tender offer.
176. See also Moylan, supra note 11, at 558. The independence of the disclosure and substantive provisions has been previously recognized by other commentators. It has been suggested that the SEC declare that certain acquisitions axe tender offers but are exempt from
application of the substantive provisions of the Act, pursuant to the SEC's power under
§14(d)(8). Id. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
177. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
178. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
179. 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). While a trial court decision has been reached, the
case has not been settled as the defendants have announced that they will appeal to the
Second Circuit. Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1978 at 14, Col. 4.
180. Primarily questionable are those presumptions as to the sophistication of institutional investors and insiders, and the extent of their insulation from pressure in ostensibly
privately negotiated transactions. Compare Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
[1978] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) f96,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1978) with S-G Securities, Inc. v.
Fuqua Investment Co., [1978] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 196,750 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 1978).
181. Although a decision has been rendered at the trial level in this case, this note will
utilize the factual circumstances of the litigation as a device for analysis of the proposed
definition rather than as a mere example of the proper disposition of a case.
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visors, 29 unrelated institutional holders as managers of hundreds of smaller
individual investors, 8 2 and three individual investors,, constituting a total of
184
38183 entities and 601 accounts in ten states and the District of Columbia.
Such a program constitutes a widespread solicitation for the equity securities of Becton, Dickinson and would satisfy this requirement of subsection (1) of the proposed definition.18 5 Further, Sun Company admitted that
its obligation to purchase was conditioned on acquiring commitments sufficient
for "negative control," or the ability to prevent the consummation of any major
corporate action by Blecton, Dickinson without Sun's consent.5 0 While the
acquiror would still occupy a minority position, "negative control" is the
threshold concept of working control for the purposes of subsection (1) of this
8
definition. 7
In regard to subsection (2), concerning whether the program was directed
to a substantial number of holders, the Sun Company acquisition presents a
close case. The determinative issue might be whether less than 35 persons were
solicited, so as to trigger the proviso in subsection (2) which creates a rebuttable presumption that the program does not constitute a tender offer. Resolution of this issue would depend on whether the court was persuaded by the
defendant's or the plaintiff's version of the facts, since the number of entities
solicited is a matter in dispute.'
The broadest approach urged on the Wellman court, counting individual
accounts rather than looking to entities alone on the premise that the purpose
of the Act is to protect all who are actually affected by a program, ignores the
nature of institutional investors' discretionary arrangements. It may nonetheless
be valid.8 9 In reality the effects of an improper purchasing program will not
182. 475 F. Supp. at 808-15. See Class Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum at 5, Id.; Pretrail
Brief of Plaintiffs, Becton, Dickinson & Co., at 2,Appendix A, Id. But see Defendant's Pretrial
Brief #1, at 30-34, Id. (alleging that only 21 institutional investors were contacted).
183. See 475 F. Supp. at 809, 824. Pretrial Brief of Plaintiffs, Becton, Dickinson and Co.,
at 2, Id. But see Defendant's Pretrial Brief #I, at 43, Id. (alleging only 33 entities contacted).
However, the exact number was never fully ascertained due to various procedural problems
with the offer of proof. Id. at 797 n.15.
184. Pretrial Brief of Plaintiffs, Becton, Dickinson & Co., at Appendix A, Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
185. See 475 F. Supp. at 824; Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 848 F. Supp. at 1252;
Note, supra note 2, at 1266. See also Pretrial Brief of Securities Exchange Commission, at 24,
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
186. Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 28, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 483
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also 475 F. Supp. at 805, 808-10.
187. Major corporate decisions such as merger, liquidation or sale of assets typically require a 2/8 vote of shareholders. CARY, CORPORATIONS 1698-1705 (4th ed. 1969). Even if the
Becton, Dickinson by-laws did not require such a percentage, which they did at the time of
Sun's acquisition, 475 F. Supp. at 832 n.23, a 34% block would be difficult to overcome in the
normal proxy contest. CARtY, CORPOaxONS 231 (4th ed. 1969).
188. See notes 180-181 supra and accompanying text. While the trial court did not discuss
the much briefed issue of the number of solicitees necessary to "trigger" application of the
Act, the reliance placed by the court on Ralston Purina and on the private offering exemption case law implicitly supports a set figure such as adopted in SEC Rule 14 6(g), to be used
to determine whether a proposed program will be a public or private transaction. 475 F. Supp.
at 818-20.
189. Perhaps the fullest implementation of the purpose of the Act as interpreted in Piper
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stop at the institutional investor which has discretionary control over individual
accounts, but will reach all persons actually owning such accounts. 190 This is
also true in the instance of arbitrage activity, where a brokerage firm purchases
many small accounts of the target's securities on the open market in anticipation of a profit upon resale to the offeror or an intervenor.' 5 ' Although only
one sale is consummated between the offeror and the arbitrage agent, many
92
public investors are indirectly affected by the arbitragors' market activity.
However, for the purpose of this analysis, it will be assumed that the factual determination as to the number of entities solicited would have been resolved in
favor of not raising the presumption of subsection (2), but without resort to
the broader policy oriented "accounts affected" computation. After consideration of subsection (3) and (4) the additional application of subsection (2) will
be readdressed. 93
Turning to subsection (3) of the proposed definition, the acquisition of
6.5 million shares or approximately 34 percent of the outstanding Becton,
Dickinson stock' 94 would clearly constitute a "substantial percentage" within
the context of this provision.'95 The fixed figures in the provisos are designed
only to exclude casual purchases, and those which do not threaten control,
from operation of the requirements of the Williams Act.
In terms of securities regulation theory and public policy, subsection (4)
brings the issues raised by a purchasing program into the sharpest relief. 96
The provisions of this subsection would require an evaluation of the manner
in which the solicitation was conducted, in light of the sophistication of the
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., investor protection, would be effected by looking to the total number of persons affected by such sales. This assumes that each account is equivalent to a public
investor. However, it also ignores the fact that most discretionary accounts are set up as such
to facilitate expert managerial decisions and eliminate the need to obtain the owner's consideration and approval. See Jansson, How a "Midnight Raid" Turned into a Nightmare for
Institutions, INsTrrTUTIONAL INVESTOR 157, 160 (Jan. 1979). See generally Hazen, supra note 2,
at 1023.
190. See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 147 n.42, 150-52.
191. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 177-80. The risk differentials increase as the market rises to reach the offer price of the target stock. Any legal action which
impedes the consummation of the offer increases the likelihood that the arbitrage agent will
not be able to dispose of the shares at a profit. Arbitrage agents can fulfill the role of a
depository in the unconventional tender offer by accumulating a large block of stock from
many small market purchases for subsequent sale directly to the bidder at his price. See also
S-G Securities v. Fuqua Investment Co., [1978] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,750 at 94,931.
192. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 15, at 177-80.
193. See text accompanying notes 203-206 infra.
194. 475 F. Supp. at 822. See also Class Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 5, Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
195. The term "substantial" can have many meanings, but the lower limits of the term
have been incorporated into the suggested definition from the Act itself. See 15 U.S.C.
§78n(d)(1), (d)(8) (1976). While the sheer number of shares acquired is relevant, the percentage of outstanding stock obtained is the critical question. Control is in essence a percentage concept. However, the trial court, in Wellman v. Dickinson opined that only the 5%
triggering figure was relevant. 475 F. Supp. at 824.
196. The concepts of a free auction market and investor protection have clashed throughout the history of federal securities regulation. It is significant to note that disclosure has been
the consistent policy choice of Congress in this area. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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holder and the propensity of the program for pressuring the offeree into making an uninformed investment decision. As a practical matter, no abstract
standards for evaluation can be established to guide the court and the proposed
definition does not attempt to do so.
Turning to the instant problem, Sun Company's purchasing program can
be separated for analysis under subsection (4) into two distinct phases. The
initial procedure consisted of face to face offers to corporate insiders, as
offerees and as agents of family trusts. 197 The second phase of the program,
which transpired a day later, consisted of a number of nearly simultaneous
telephone solictations of institutional investors with major Becton, Dickinson
portfolios coupled with a few personal solicitations of non-insider individuals.
All of these solicitations were initiated after the close of the market on a
Monday and concluded prior to resumption of market trading at noon the
following day.' 98
The first phase, involving insiders, was directed at offerees who were presumably on a more equal footing with the offeror than the passive public investor.199 The offerees knew the identity of the offeror and had a general understanding of the nature and scope of the purchase program. All of these offerees
consulted with advisors or co-owners over a period of a day and decided to
accept the offer. 200 While there was obviously pressure to sell and thus align
themselves with the acquirers, the insiders had an independent reason to sell
their sizable holdings of stock, totalling 8.9 percent,201 due to their dissatisfaction with the recently reorganized management.20 2 Considered separately, this
program would seem to constitute a fairly normal privately negotiated transfer,
outside both the scope of the term "tender offer" and the purpose of the Williams Act. The question arises whether such a conclusion by the court would
affect the application of subsection (2) as to the remaining or second "phase"
of the purchasing program.20 3
197. 475 F. Supp. at 808-10, 812-15, 820. See also Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 80. Id.
198. 475 F. Supp. at 808-12, 820. See also Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 33, Id.
199. See 475 F. Supp. at 797-810. See also Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1, at 80-31, Id.;
Pretrial Brief of Plaintiffs, Becton, Dickinson &cCo. at 3, Id.; Pretrial Brief of the Securities
Exchange Commission at 6, Id. See also Nachman Corp. v. Haifred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) g94,455 at 95,591.

200. Most consulted with private attorneys or other trustees prior to making a commitment to sell. See 475 F. Supp. at 808; Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1 at 80-31, Id. See also
Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief, Becton, Dickinson and Co., at Appendix A, Id.
201. Class Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum at 5, Welman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
202. 475 F. Supp. at 797-808; Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1 at 10-11, Id. A corporate
power struggle had recently taken place with the result that one director, a co-founder of
Becton, Dickinson, had been removed as chairman of the board. This individual sold to Sun
Company, as did a second director who had been removed from the slate of board nominees.

Id.
203. Logically, if a separable part of an overall program failed one part of the definition,
then those transactions could be deemed outside the scope of the Williams Act on the theory
that severing into separable parts for analysis would serve to reduce a program to its core
offensive transactions. But this approach is contra to the longstanding SEC practice of collapsing transactions within a limited timeframe into one transaction for purposes of regulation. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SEcURITIs REGULATION 551-769 (4th ed. 1977).
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If the court were to disregard the prior solicitations and apply the entitysolicited approach assumed for this analysis to the telephone blitz, 20 4 the
number of relevant offerees would be so reduced as to trigger the rebuttable
presumption created in subsection (2) against the second program in itself
constituting a tender offer. 205 Of course, the result would differ if the court
adopted the most radical argument and looked past the institutional investor
as the target offeree and instead considered the total number of accounts and
individuals affected. 200 In either event, analysis under subsection (4) of the
degree of pressure exerted by the second phase of the purchasing program
would proceed, but the plaintiff's burden of proof is increased under the better
reasoned entities solicited approach because of the presumption raised in sub207
section (2) due to the small number of solicitees.
Indeed, separate consideration of Sun Company's approach to the insiders
and the program of telephone solicitation of institutional investors may not be
justifiable.2 0 8 Consummation of all purchases, whether from insider or institution, was contingent upon Sun Company obtaining commitments for a specified
percentage of the outstanding Becton, Dickinson stock. 209 The insiders also
agreed to keep the pending telephone solicitation confidential until after it
had been made, thereby implicitly joining in Sun Company's takeover at210
tempt.
However, the gravamen of the case is the second phase of the program in
which the institutional investors contacted by telephone were quoted a set
price, at a 37 percent premium over the closing market figure, without disclosure of the bidder's identity. 211 The offerees were told that the offeror sought
only a minority position and that the consummation of the offer was conditioned upon at least 20 percent of the outstanding shares being offered to the
bidder.2 1 2 The offerees were then given from 30 minutes to one hour in which
to reply, 212 although extensions up to the next morning were granted in two
instances. 214 One offeree who attempted to negotiate the price was unsuccessful,
204. See text following note 190 supra.
205. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
206. Pretrial Brief of Plaintiff, Becton, Dickinson & Co. at 2, Appendix A, Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
207. While the 'accounts affected' approach has appeal, there is no assurance that each
account correlates to a distinct individual. Additionally, this approach attacks the entire concept of discretionary accounts which is at the core of the institutional investing procedure.
Therefore, rather than piercing the institutional veil, less weight should be given to the
presumed insulation from pressure of such institutions in analyzing the effect of a transaction.
See Block & Schwarzfeld, supranote 3, at 146-47.
208. See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
209. 475 F. Supp. at 808-10. See also Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1 at 30, Id.
210. 475 F. Supp. at 808. See also Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1 at 33-35, Id.; Pretrial
Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission at 24-30, Id.; Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief, Becton,
Dickinson & Co. at 15-18, Id.
211. 475 F. Supp. at 809-10, 822, 824-25. See also Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1 at 33-35, Id.
212. 475 F. Supp. at 810.
213. Id. See also Defendant's Pretrial Brief #1 at 36, Id.; Pretrial Brief of the Securities
Exchange Commission at 25, Id.
214. See 475 F. Supp. at 824; Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief, Becton, Dickinson and Co. at 31-32,
Id.; Pretrial Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission at 26, Id.
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and was excluded from purchases made. 21 5 The inherent pressure in such a
program of offers and its similarity to a conventional tender offer is apparent.2 1,6
However, counter-balancing these factors is the sophistication and presumed
insulation from pressure of these institutional investors which under the
circumstances may not be justified.
This presumption has been called into question recently, and has been the
subject of concern and investigation due to the importance of such institutions
in American corporate structure and the fiduciary duties imposed on them due
to their large discretionary power over hundreds of small investor accounts.217
The Williams Act, being remedial, protects against the potential for abuses by
offerors using pressure tactics to acquire large amounts of equity securities.
Certainly that potential exists where, as here, offers are made with strict time
constraints and inadequate disclosure, during an obviously widespread solicitation. Due to the actual and logical interdependence of the two phases, a court
should find that under the proposed definition the entire program constituted
a tender offer in violation of the Act, separability of the first phase and sophisti218
cation of the institutional investors notwithstanding.
A violation should be determined even if the court separates the two phases
and deems the rebuttable presumption of subsection (2) as having been raised
with respect to both programs by reason of the small number of entity offerees
involved. Whereas the first phase had all the hallmarks of a truly privately
negotiated transaction between two sophisticated parties, the second phase did
not exhibit these hallmarks and, therefore, should not escape regulation. Regarding the institutional investors, the strength of the presumptions raised
because of their small number and supposed insulation from pressure is subject
to greater doubt given the unusually intense pressure generated by the telephone campaign and the very large number of persons who might be affected
by an improper tender offer. In light of the Congressional purpose of the
Williams Act, the weight of policy considerations is in favor of regulation rather
than permitting such an acquisition scheme to operate without restraints in the
future.

215. See 475 F. Supp. at 824.
216. The trial court in Wellman v. Dickinson, agreed that sophistication was not a substitute and that it serves no purpose unless it can be applied in the context of the relevant
transaction. 475 F. Supp. at 823. For a summary of the dynamics of a conventional tender
offer, see notes 11-23 supra and accompanying text.
217. See SEC Institutional Investor Study, [1969-1972 Transfer Binder, Special Studies]
FEn. SEc. L. R P. (CCH) 174,701 (1971); Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 3, at 137, 146-47;
Hazen, supra note 2, at 1055-60. In 1971 some 30% of all corporate equity was institutionally
controlled; 39% of all large public companies were so owned including a large percentage of
NYSE listed companies. Every company in which there is substantial institutional investment
is by inference subject to the same fate as Becton, Dickinson. See Block & Schwarzfeld, supra
note 3, at 137-38.
218. This conclusion was reached by the court without resort to a generic definition.
However, the court relied heavily upon the eight factors proposed by the SEC in making its
determination. This procedure emphatically highlights the need for a definative SEC Rule in
the area. 475 F. Supp. at 823-26.
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CONCLUSION

For over a decade, the failure of Congress to provide a definition of "tender
offer" while attempting to regulate the use of the technique has led to confusion and uncertainty in planning as well as enforcement of the regulations.
The Securities Exchange Commission has exacerbated the problem by failing
to use its rule-making power to fill the gap left by Congress. The task of developing a definition has been left to an overburdened and institutionally illequipped judiciary. The case-by-case approach, rather than providing a generic
definition, has merely succeeded in identifying certain characteristics of a tender
offer which transcend its conventional conceptualization. The suggested definition encompasses both the purpose of the Williams Act and the characteristics
of a tender offer which have been judicially identified. It provides a practical
and flexible framework for the analysis of new acquisition tactics, with the aim
of preventing abusive techniques without going to the extreme of regulating all
transfers of control.
It is strongly urged that the proposed definition or a similar formulation be
immediately adopted and included in the SEC proposed rules and regulations
for tender offers. Continued definitional uncertainty only serves to thwart the
Congressional purpose of providing investor protection through relevant disclosure, and encourage acquisition-minded corporations to walk the line, taking
advantage of the confusion engendered by inconclusive case decisions. Such a
state of affairs should no longer be tolerated and mandates immediate and
affirmative action on either the part of the Securities Exchange Commission or
Congress.
LEwis F. MURPHY
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